This work outlines the novel application of the empirical analysis of causation, presented by Kutach, to the study of information theory and its role in physics. The central thesis of this paper is that causation and information are identical functional tools for distinguishing controllable correlations, and that this leads to a consistent view, not only of information theory, but also of statistical physics and quantum information. This approach comes without the metaphysical baggage of declaring information a fundamental ingredient in physical reality and exorcises many of the otherwise puzzling problems that arise from this view-point, particularly obviating the problem of non-local causal influences in quantum entanglement. Additionally, this duality of causation and information allows for a reconciliation of related problems in physics, like that of the 'excess baggage' in quantum mechanics. Finally, it is demonstrated that black hole holography can be understood as a property of the causal structure of black hole spacetimes and is thus not necessarily a fundamental result in any sense of the word. This forms the basis of a suggestion whereby black holes destroy information but do not result in a unitarity violation.
reality into three layers for the purpose of this analysis: the first being fundamental reality that is only concerned with the metaphysics of causation, the other two being derivative realities relating each to metaphysical and non-metaphysical aspects of causation. We will only be interested in those layers discussing the metaphysics of causation and will simply refer to them as fundamental and derivative as a result. Fundamental Reality (FR) is characterised by four simple points:
1. FR is how things really are 2. FR is the real basis for events in derivative reality 3. FR is as determinate as reality gets 4. FR is consistent.
The reason these distinctions are useful is that the usual 'cause-effect' relation between bits of reality, each with certain characteristics, will be relevant within the derivative levels of reality, it will not be part of the fundamental metaphysics, but is ultimately predicated on the laws of fundamental reality. It will be seen in the following that, 'cause-effect' relations depend only on a part of the full fundamental situation, this being selected by means of derivative phenomena. Implying that 'cause-effect' relations belong to no one layer of reality, so they are safely excised from our metaphysics, obviating many problems that arise when 'cause-effect' relations are held to be metaphysical necessities. This is justified on the basis of the following consideration proposed in (Kutach [2013] ): a ferromagnet consisting of spins is moved near a device that detects currents via the deflection of a needle. The 'cause-effect' relation will consist of the motion of the magnet causing the deflection of the needle. However, the movement of the spin system is only one event in a very large set of fundamental events that result in the movement of the needle. We single out the movement event because we believe it more significant (in a counterfactual sense) to the resulting effect than the other related fundamental events.
To illustrate the distinction of fundamental and derivative realities we can follow (Kutach [2013] ) in considering the framework of classical physics (as this was once thought fundamental). This consists of a limited set of fundamental objects needed to define the laws: particles, properties of mass and charge, and a spacetime equipped with a distance relation.
These ingredients are a minimal set of all that is needed to explain fundamental classical reality. Other objects that exist or occur as a result of these fundamental existents are derivative as they are neither part of the framing of the fundamental laws nor assumed in them (Kutach [2013] ). An example of this is velocity in classical physics, as this corresponds to no fundamental structure, needing a frame of reference (not part of the fundamental set of existents) to have any definite value.
There are, of course, a wide variety of both one (Mackie, Lewis, Suppes, Salmon, Kistler, Dowe [1973 , 1970 , 1977 , 1999 , 2000 ) and two (Good, Good, Sober, Eells, Salmon, Hall [1961 , 1962 , 1985 , 1991 , 1993 ) core concept analyses of causation where 'cause-effect' is taken to be a metaphysical necessity. However, the difference here that results in causation being merely an empirically useful derivative phenomenon is that no one of the three layers of reality hosts the whole of a core concept of causation or entirely encapsulates a 'cause-effect' relation. In this way, causation can be described in terms of 'effective strategies', that is, a causal relation is one that some agent could in principle use to bring about a desired effect. Note that this does not tie causation to agency, as this is merely used to analyse potential causal relations and no agent/agency is necessary to the existence of causal relations.
This approach to the study of causation will be formalised in this work, and the mathematical formalism will then be leveraged to address several key problems in the overlap of physics and information theory. This will be done by demonstrating that the notion of information used in physics is identical to the definition of causation in terms of empirical analysis. Once this identification has been made it becomes possible to obviate the circularity in Shannon's original definition of distinct states (Shannon [1948] ) and information. This is because the notion of what states can carry information is now formulated in terms of available causal correlations, which depend only on the possible counterfactuals as well as the prescriptions of fundamental physical laws in a manner similar to that recommended in (Maudlin [2007] ).
The identity between causation and information is then used to address the problem of 'excess baggage' in quantum mechanics (Hardy [2004] ), where states (if they are in some way ontic) must seemingly carry both finite and infinite amounts of classical information (Leifer, Jennings and Leifer [2014, 2016] ), in contravention of the established finite limits of the Holevo theorem (Holevo [1973] ). The correspondence of information and causation is used to tease out this problem and demonstrate that only the finite information carried by the quantum state actually corresponds to causal correlations of a single qubit, the infinite component is accommodated by an ensemble of qubits only.
Another prominent problem addressed is the possibility of non-local causal action in Bell Inequality scenarios (Butterfield [1992] ). This issue is resolved by the prominence of control in the aforementioned notion of causation. As the idea that uncontrollable events can be causal (Maudlin, Ruetsche [1994 , 2011 ) allows attribution of non-local influence to local operations, rather than the quantum state itself, a point that will be argued by appealing to results in the structure of quantum field theories (Redhead, Ruetsche [1995 , 2011 ). This helps to isolate the source of quantum 'weirdness' and suggests that quantum non-locality might be best investigated via the inter-play of spacetime locality and notions of locality defined by quantum states themselves. Additionally, it will be argued, based on the aforementioned results, that a causal proposition, following the prescription of (Maudlin [2007] ), cannot be constructed for these non-local influences, due to their dependence on the quantum vacuum.
Thus, it is vital that any account of causation does not allow for non-local causal influence in this scenario. This particular work extends the results from (Fenton-Glynn and Kroeder [2015] ) by showing that the causal factors assigned by our formalism for space-like separated entangled measurements are symmetric, thus reinforcing the argument from (Fenton-Glynn and Kroeder [2015] ) that there is no possible causal ordering.
Finally, the role of information theory in well-known black hole problems is examined through the lens of empirical causation. Here we demonstrate that the apparent holography of black holes can be motivated entirely in terms of their causal structure without appeal to some fundamental notion of holography, or any implications for black hole micro-states. The problem of information-loss (Hawking, Hawking [1975 , 1976 ), and thus firewalls (A. Almheiri and Sully [2013] ), is also tackled by using the distinction between causal correlations and distinguishable states to suggest that while information may be lost, unitarity can still be preserved. This paper is structured as follows: In section 2 the causal formalism is layed out and discussed. This formalism is then applied to the problem of non-local causation in quantum mechanics in section 3. Section 4 outlines the link between causation and information in physics. Section 5 looks briefly at the implications of this causal theory in statistical physics.
Finally, sections 6 and 7 discuss the insight that can be achieved into the excess baggage and black hole information-loss problems with this empirical analysis of causation.
Causation
The first ingredient in this analysis of causation is the distinction between fundamental and derivative reality. This distinction informs the way we talk about events within these two realities, those that occur in derivative reality being the only cases where we must explain why causality might be useful or apparent. To this end we classify the events of derivative reality as course-grained, such an event E is a collection of fundamental events that might correspond to the derivative event, while a contextualised event is course-grained with a reasonable probability distribution over its members. In Kutach's presentation, this distribution need not be empirical or rigorous in any way (in order to accommodate informal notions of causality), barring that it must satisfy the axioms of probability theory.
In order to determine if two time-ordered events, A and B are causally correlated we will employ the following terminology. The protrast of the ordered pair (A,B) is a set of fundamental events in an event A that would correlate with B being said to occur, whereas the contrast of (A,B) is a set of events in a reasonably chosen contrasting event C that correlate with B occurring, equivalent to imagining the causal pair (C,B) instead. We can also, of course, consider causation in terms of a derivative event A and the probability it evolves into B under apparent laws of derivative reality. At this point it is worth remarking upon the fact that this formalism illustrates the very close linkage of causality and counterfactuals. We note that Lewis (Lewis [1973] ) championed analysis in terms of counterfactuals as giving a complete account of causality, but the literature is littered with difficulties that this program encounters (as described in (Maudlin, Butterfield [2007 ) for example). We will see, in the course of this paper, that this empirical account of causality has far greater similarity to the approach advocated by Maudlin (Maudlin [2007] ). Whereby, physical law provides the connection between counterfactuals and causality and is thus the vital ingredient needed to give a complete account. Thus the notion of a 'reasonable choice' of the contrasting event C is necessarily bound up in what counterfactuals would be allowed by physical law.
In the context of an ordered pair of contextualised events C and E, the probability of E given C is written as P(E|C). The nature of these probabilities will be taken as the proportion of fundamental events in C which will evolve into those within E, meaning there is a robust link between these probabilities and objective frequency measurements. Kutach then invokes the notion of promotion: the degree to which C 1 promotes E is given by the difference between the propensity with which events in C 1 and those in a contrasting event C 2 would evolve into those in E. This propensity can be determined either through fundamental or derivative laws (as these should agree on matters of empirical outcome promotion). We then propose to formalise the degree to which C 1 promotes E as the logarithmic difference
This can be generalised to a larger set of events that might cause E, rather than simply the two
where w i is a weight, given by 1 N if we cannot define the absolute probability P(C i ). The function C(E, C) is then proposed as a measure of the causal association of the events C and E. Under this assumption, if C(C, E) is positive-definite we may conclude that it is reasonable to state that E is causally correlated with C. However, if C(C, E) ≤ 0 then we must conclude that on average other events that promote E equally or to a greater degree than C does, making causal claims about (C, E) weak. The relative magnitude of the C function will also dictate the extent of the causal association between the two events.
There are two approaches to continuous families of events, the first is a simple generalisation of Eq. (2.2),
However, this presents a difficulty in enumerating causal correlations. Therefore, the continuum should be reduced to a discrete case by identifying causal classes of events. In general an event A in a continuous family can be characterised by some set of parameters η, it seems appropriate to determine whether A(η 1 ) and A(η 2 ) are contrasting events by the 'outcome continuity' of η. Thus if one can continuously deform η 1 to obtain η 2 , without causing a change in the most probable outcome of A(η), then the two events must be seen to belong to the same 'contrast class', meaning they cannot be chosen as contrasting events because they are causally equivalent. For a larger set of outcomes a contrast class with constitute all events A(η) that preserve the same probability heirachy. Continuity is important because the value of η will serve to demonstrate control of a particular correlation, you can 'tune' η to more strongly promote a given outcome while conducting what is ostensibly the same experiment. We can appreciate the use of 'outcome continuity' if we view a lack of this as signalling that these events assign the greatest probability to differing causal histories, making η 1 and η 2 causally distinct. We note that η 1 and η 2 might anyway result in the same event history but this does not damage the use of 'outcome continuity' as the argument is probabilistic in nature.
In order to take the concept of the contrast class into account, any probability P(E|A), where A ≡ A(η), will be assumed to be averaged over the relevant continuous region of η unless otherwise stated. The reason for this is to make causal arguments robust and not simply dependent on the choice of parameters, which is of particular concern in the contrasting causes, as these might otherwise be chosen to minimise their association with a given outcome. This attempt to characterise contrasting events is aimed at allowing physical law and operational considerations to determine our contrasting event classes, in keeping with the important role of physical law in determining the counterfactuals necessary in causation. It is very clear that if we are to make an empirical analysis of causation that we should only admit causal counterfactuals that would stand up to empirical inspection.
In order to make full use of the function C we can make use of a causal table. Illustrated below for a system with two events C 1 and C 2 with two possible outcomes E 1 and E 2 .
In this table we can scan down column i to pick out possible causes for event E i . These can then be tested by scanning across the row of a favoured cause to see that it does not uniformally promote multiple outcomes.
The method of enumerating causal correlations in a given system requires remarking upon.
For a given correlation we might always pick the largest C value and decide it is the only causal correlation. However, this cannot be correct, as a simple example can show. Consider a configuration of N molecules that results in a total energy E, which correlates with some additional observable values. In principle there are many such configurations, each of which has probability 1 of associating itself with measurements of the observables that correlate to E. Thus, among this set of correlations all have C = 0 as we cannot prefer any of them.
Moreover, we might consider all these states with energy E as one single causal class. It is evident that this difficulty arises due to the determinism of the problem, in that states have either P = 1 or P = 0. Additionally, one can appreciate that P = 0 states cannot be considered valid counterfactuals, so they cannot be included to make C non-zero for those with P = 1.
However, this difficulty can be resolved simply because of the determinism, all of the P = 1 correlations are causal, as though they have C = 0, they are deterministic and there are no other valid contrasts to consider. Thus, the process of enumeration must be cautious, for a given effect we will take the causal classes with positive C values to be the set of causal correlations that produce this effect, in the case that all have the same C, or there appear to be no causal correlations at all, we must carefully inspect the P values to confirm any conclusions.
Thus, we aim to present the causality measure C as a formal and mathematical realisation of Kutach's promotion causality, allowing it to be used in more specialised physical discussion as well as assessments of the general use of causality.
In order to illustrate this conception of causality we can consider a situation where an experimenter is placed within a dark room and presented with a button and a light. This light cycles smoothly between maximal brightness and being off with a period of a few seconds.
The brightness cycle is given by
Whenever the button is pressed during the cycle the light stops, adopting a probabilistically chosen state according to
The probability of it choosing on and off are given by how close it is to either extremum, with a 'twilight' 50/50 state in between. Because of the importance of outcome determination in causality we will investigate whether the experimenter can 'cause' the light to remain on as much as possible. The event C l is then identified with the experimenter pressing his button when the light is in the on-phase of the cycle, its contrasts C d with a button press in the off-phase, C t is a 'twilight' press, and C n as no action, finally E is the light remaining on. This also illustrates a division of a continuous family of events into causal classes. First let us enumerate our expectations of causation. C n clearly cannot have any causal association with the light remaining in any state, we feel that C d should not be causally associated with E but we do expect C l to be, regardless of the how close the light is to peak brightness within the on part of the cycle. We expect that C t will lie between C d and C l , as it does still reasonably promote the light staying on but it does not favour on over off.
We can quickly see that C n cannot have C >= 0, as it has P(E|C n ) = 0. It is also an invalid contrast as the 'laws' of this system hold that it can never be correlated with the light staying on. Since P(E|C t ) = 0.5, putting this into either the continuous or discrete forms of C will yield C(C t , E) > 0 but we will find that C(C t , E) < C(C l , E). Similarly we will find that the relationship C(C, E) > 0 if P(E|C) > e −1 . To fully clarify this example we present the table below:
C t 0.14 0.14
This illustrates that although C t is positive, it is uniform across the row, and thus does not promote either outcome above the other.
This analysis conforms very nicely to our expectations but is very bare-bones, it includes no confounding factors like the finite reflexes of the experimenter. Making it completely general would make all of our probabilities under-determined. However, we can see that despite this, the experimenter can promote the illuminated outcome by timing his button press close to the peak brightness of the light. The band of causally indecisive cases around the 'twilight' point will become larger, but, it's clear that the simple analysis will give a satisfactory account in any case where the light is significantly distant from 'twilight', as long as the experimenter's reflexes could reasonably expected to be faster than the cycle period. Thus the promotion causality factor C reproduces our intuitive expectations in both formal and under-determined (informal) scenarios. As long as we can reasonably decide which outcome probability will be larger we can use C to make causal inferences. By studying the 'twilight' case we can see that promotion of a given outcome is indeed the vital ingredient of this account of causality. If the light always chose its state randomly whenever the button was pressed we would find that C = 0 regardless of how we tried to vary the conditions of the button press. Since every input event A(η) promotes B to the same degree we cannot find a relationship between our experimental conditions η and our outcome probability P(B|A(η)). Moreover, each A(η)
promotes a contrasting outcome equally to B. Therefore, B occurring cannot be said to be determined by any of A(η), as a contrasting occurrence is equally likely under these conditions. In this way it is evident that Kutach's theory gives rise to the notion of causality as a functional tool used to make the distinction between correlations we can control, in the first case the experimenter can reliably keep the light in a chosen state, and those which we cannot control, as in the second example where the experimenter's power to promote a desired outcome has been removed and outcomes are independent of his variation of the experimental parameters. Thus we can see that causality can be apparent within derivative reality without being a necessary ingredient of fundamental reality. What is also clear from this example is that our causal expectations are recovered because we selected counterfactuals that are allowed by physical law and assign them physically sensible weightings, arbitrary fantasy counterfactuals could, for obvious reasons, easily undo our reasonable causal expectations (as argued by Maudlin (Maudlin [2007] )).
Quantum Non-Locality and Causation
Having given a brief demonstration of the credentials of this account of causation we can turn to an important problem for counterfactual accounts. We will see that this issue is alleviated within the context of promotion causation. The problem in question is one of an experiment with two entangled, perfectly anti-correlated spins measured, at spacelike separation, on differing axes. According to Butterfield (Butterfield [1992] ) this commits counterfactual causation to the existence of superluminal causal influences. To formalise the problem we have a spin in the state |ψ = a ↑ |↑↓ + a ↓ |↓↑ , where |↓↑ corresponds to spin A being measured as 'down' and B measured as 'up' along the set of axes chosen when measuring A.
We will label the measurement events as A ↑ , A ↓ , B ↑ , B ↓ . Clearly if we choose to measure B along an axis that makes an angle θ to the axis used for A, the complete anti-correlation will no longer be found. The change in the probability of B ↓ (along the rotated axes) occurring
.
Thus the degree of causal association between measurements of A and B seems to depend on the angle θ (satisfying controllability requirements). However, it is vital to ask if A ↓ is in fact an event that can be reliably induced. The answer is that A ↓ has a probability of p ↓ = |a ↓ | 2 of occurring. Thus the question of causal association between A and B events is ill-formed. If we retain the causal pair (A ↓ , B ↑ ) we must conclude that our set of causal influences also contains the post-selection process, in which case the causal ordering becomes dubious at best. The correct formulation would be 'does the event A = p ↓ A ↓ + p ↑ A ↑ with offset θ cause either B ↓ or B ↑ ?' The corresponding function is given by C(A θ , B ↓ ) = log
C vanishes independent of θ. This indicates that the apparently causal effect of measurement associated with θ, or post-selection, depends strongly upon the preparation of |ψ . From this we can see that there appears to be some degeneracy in the causal structure between the choices of θ and |ψ . However, this can be resolved simply by noting that the effect of θ is to rotate between different effective |ψ preparations, where the effective preparation is the one seen by the apparatus at B. This resolution allows us to conclude that the causal influence is the preparation |ψ , as the effective state measured at B is pre-determined by the |ψ for all possible choices of θ. This, combined with the evident symmetry
indicates that there is no clear causal association between the measurements. This conclusion is reinforced by the argument made in (Fenton-Glynn and Kroeder [2015] ), in which the authors point out that the space-like nature of the separation means that the time ordering of the measurement events is arbitrary. This is important as there is clearly no grounds for the assertion that A ↑ could cause the preparation of |ψ . Moreover, it is evident that the C function for this scenario will not be symmetric with its causal opposite at all. Thus, in the given account of causality, there are no grounds for asserting a causal influence between the two measurements, as the outcomes are satisfactorily attributed to the preparation of the state |ψ .
This example also serves to reinforce the requirement that we choose our causal pairs in a physically consistent manner. One can also see that this result justifies a no-communication theorem between two experimenters, one equipped with spin A and the other with B. No measurement of A can induce a causal change in B that is not due simply to the state preparation itself, thus the experimenter could never detect how A was measured by measuring B. This point already anticipates the main thrust of this paper, which is an identification of promotion causality with notions of 'information'.
Another avenue of reasoning can lead us to the same point of the state being the cause of non-locality apparently associated with local operations. This avenue relies on results in quantum field theory, particularly the Reeh-Schlieder theorem, one consequence of which is that there is no local formulation of the vacuum state (Redhead, Ruetsche [1995 , 2011 ). Other local states are then formed by the application of local creation operators. Given that field operators are local and Lorenz covariance is enforced on QFT processes, this all combines to suggest that the seeds of any non-local influence are to be found within the quantum state itself and not as a result of any operations performed on the state. In particular, because the non-local effects are so strongly linked to the vacuum state it is questionable as to whether any coherent counterfactuals could be posited to result in these uncontrollable non-local influences being causal (even within a theory that admits uncontrollable causation). This suggests that any description of causation in terms of counterfactuals should not admit non-local quantum correlations as causal if it is to remain consistent. Furthermore, we see the suggestion that quantum mechanics has 'state-locality' above spacetime locality in a heirachy of importance.
This 'state-locality' results in no-signalling rules precisely because the non-local effects are not a result of local operations but rather the fact that locality is defined by the quantum state as well as the spacetime. As this means there are no possible spacetime non-local operations with which to establish non-local causal correlations. One can summarise this in the pithy form: 'it is not the probe that is spacetime non-local, but rather what is being probed'.
Information
To study the notion of information we will approach it from the perspective of communication and how this relates to the underlying physics. To do so we must define some terms, the first being a dictionary: this is a set of symbols which are assigned to some states within a physical system, each symbol having some meaning which we are free to choose when specifying the dictionary. For example we can encode a binary dictionary onto a current being measured in a wire, no current detected is assigned the symbol 0 while detection above a given threshold is assigned 1. If we then measure the current for a length of time we can translate this into a serious of 0's and 1's which may be interpreted as a message which may contain information.
By determining the number of distinguishable states available to our transmitting system we can calculate the Shannon entropy of a message, in the binary case we have two available states and thus a message of N symbols has S ∝ N log (2) which provides an information measure when the results of measurements on our system are treated as values of a random variable. To discuss the relation of causality and information let us first enumerate the correlations in our binary system: we can have generation of current by some process at one end of the wire that correlates with detection of a similar amplitude current at the other end, or the case of no current being generated being correlated with below-threshold current detected at the other end. However, there are other correlations available to the binary system: these being the cases of 'mis-correlation', where we detect a current without being correlated to generation or where we detect no current despite a current being generated. At least some of these 'mis-correlations' would be physically justifiable, so we must ask under what conditions can we use the distinguishable states of a system to encode information. It is then clear that if we wish to use the distinguishable states of a system to transmit information then we must be able to reliably induce particular correlations in that system. Otherwise, the very notion of the 'distinguishability' of these states is lost. In the binary system for instance, if we cannot reliably induce a current that is found upon subsequent measurement to be above the given threshold then we are in danger of scrambling our message, as our 1's might frequently appear as 0's (and thus no longer be clearly distinguished between). A particular physical system X can then be said to be capable of transmitting/containing information if we can reliably map some dictionary onto a subset of possible correlations within that system. We contend that this subset is composed of only the causal correlations of the system in question. This can be demonstrated using the terminology established in the previous discussion. Let A be the process we use to attempt to induce a particular physical state x in the system X and B be the realisation/measurement of that state. Then, if we have a case where C(A, B) ≤ 0, or |C| ≤ ǫ, we must conclude that whether or not we can realise our desired state x through the process A is highly mis-correlated and cannot be said to produce a distinguishable state. Therefore, if we attempt to transmit/store a sequence of symbols with X it will be akin to a stream of bits where 1 and 0 are frequently interchanged, garbling any message we might send and thus preventing us from transmitting any desired information. Clearly if all correlations available to the system have C = 0 (and are confirmed non-causal) we must conclude that there can be no information transmitted/stored. Every added correlation class with C significantly greater than zero must therefore expand the possible information content of messages realised within the system, as we can reliably expand our dictionary with each added causal correlation. We can therefore conclude that for a correlation to contain information it must necessarily be a causal correlation and conversely that any causal correlation may store or transmit information. Thus we propose that information is defined to be a property of causal correlations rather than distinguishable states. Importantly this definition of information clears up the problem of circularity in Shannon's original definition: Information is stored in causal correlations and these are defined by the measure C and thus by the possible counterfactuals and probabilities derived from our theory of physical law. This means that, although causal correlations are those that can carry information, they are not defined as such and thus any circularity is obviated. Additionally, the definition of causal classes provides a natural way to obviate problems of distinguishability in continuous variable systems, by differentiating between them via their promotion of outcomes. Furthermore, we also find that the Shannon entropy can be determined through the counting of causal correlations available to the system. This is because this counting is degenerate with that of distinguishable physical states when these are members of derivative reality (this being the domain of 'classical' information theory).
However, the examples presented in the remainder of this work will demonstrate that the counting of causal correlations provides a far more robust and consistent measure of information content. Generalising the counting of causal correlations, by analogy with Shannon theory (Shannon [1948] ), the entropy becomes
where the sum runs over the causal correlation classes corresponding to the contextualised pairs (A i ,B i ). The weight p i of each correlation class is the probability of the correlation being realised.
The preceding arguments suggest a striking agreement between the notions of derivative empirical causation and information. It follows that this equivalence implies that there is nothing 'informational' in the laws that govern our fundamental reality, just as these laws are not causal. This must follow from the notion that causality is not so much a property of any fundamental reality as it is a tool for its analysis, so information is not a physical property of correlations as much as it is a flag of the controllability of said correlations. This stands at odds with a prevailing school of thought within the physical sciences which champions the 'information is physical' view-point, notably articulated by Brillouin (Brillouin [1952] ) and Deutsch (Deutsch and Marletto [2014] ) among others. In this paradigm information is a fundamental ingredient in laws of physics, and that information itself is an essentially physical quantity. For this reason we must supply an argument as to why information seems sufficiently significant in physics as to warrant such extraordinary metaphysical assertions, while being simply a tool of studying reality. It must be immediately apparent that this is answered by the entire premise of the presented model of causality, or simply put: information theory is so applicable in sciences because its very formulation guarantees it to be so. In fact the nature of information as a demarcation between useful and non-useful correlations makes it impossible that it would not be applicable to the study of correlation and regularity that tends to compose the majority of sciences. We note that this does not justify the scientific status of the use of causality/information, but merely explains it. The justification of the use of causation in scientific endeavour will be examined in future work.
Statistical Physics
The previously presented view of information has some important consequences, the first being an abstract and objective view of statistical physics.
Due to the large number of the degrees of freedom in a system like a gas there must be a large number of physically exact states (full sets of positions and momenta for all particles) that correspond to any measured statistical property. Thus we can see that any such property of the gas is compatible with a large number of correlations between the exact state of the gas and the statistical value. On first glance it seems that there is symmetry between the description of statistical mechanics and the distinction between derivative and fundamental events made by Kutach, but it must be immediately noted that statistical and exact states exist within the same level of reality. Thus the correspondence between a given statistical-state and exact-state, in terms of measurable correlations, is something that can be causally investigated without any appeal to the nature of underlying fundamental events. The intuitive causal notion which is to be exploited is that the fact that the system is in a given exact state will determine what statistical values are returned by our measurement, and thus our inferred statistical state.
The causal nature of this correlation may be disputed but it is definitely true that if we have some machine capable of exactly preparing physical states then we can control the resulting statistical properties, thus the correlation is most definitely controllable and meets the minimum requirements of the stated model of causality. Therefore, the elements of our problem are the event E, which is our measuring a particular statistical property value e, an event M corresponding to the system being in a physical state m and a set of all other possible N − 1 state-occupation events M. Our events are functions of a continuous parameter set η with causal classes given by groups of events that have different η but the same E. It is clear
and we find that C p ∼ log (P(E|M)), when N ≫ 1, as the summation will be approximately common for every choice of M. It is clear that this highly simple relation between statistical physics probability and C exists because these probabilities are constructed by explicitly examining the counterfactual possibilities allowed by physical law. In a micro-canonical setting, only the set of E degenerate states can have non-zero probability, and all of these will have P(E|M) = 1, thus our formula for S , or the disorder of the system, reduces to the counting of causal correlations as we expect. This subset will not be preferable amongst each other, but never the less are deterministic and the only valid set of contrasts. Thus, they must all be included within a causal enumeration. This means that the statistical-exact correlations are indeed causal and the process of state enumeration in statistical physics can be abstracted to the more general notion of causal correlation counting. The link to information theory is made through the counting of causal correlations. We can see that systems with causal correlations like this can be analysed in terms of assigning a dictionary to the causal correlations and then S will also characterise the information content of a symbol generated by measurement of the exact state of a system with property E. This observation goes a long way to explaining the enormous generality of the 'maximum entropy' method encapsulated within statistical physics and is also important as it may be misleading to think of all problems where such methods are applicable as involving the counting of underlying micro-states. This is due to the fact that, in our enumeration, we did not need to appeal to any underlying fundamental states, only derivative laws and states that result from fundamental processes.
In quantum mechanics it has been demonstrated that a 'qubit' system with two measurable states, referred to as 'up' or |↑ and 'down' or |↓ , possesses a vast space of possible quantum states (Montina [2008] ). Commonly this is interpreted as meaning we should be able to encode a huge amount of retrievable/'classical' information in such a system (Hardy, Leifer [2004 , 2014 ) as this should scale with the size of the state space (according to the notion that information is a property of distinguishable states). This becomes remarkable when it is observed that we cannot retrieve any more than one bit from such a system (Holevo [1973] ), all the non-retrievable information is thus referred to as 'excess baggage' by Hardy (Hardy [2004] ) and it must be explained why such a vast state space can offer up so little information.
This problem can be viewed as follows: the states of a qubit can be expressed as the points on the surface of a sphere of unit radius, known as the Bloch sphere. Thus, they are a function of two continuous parameters. This means that, for a given qubit, the probabilities of measuring 'up' or 'down' vary continuously depending on the basis we choose to measure the qubit in (Jennings and Leifer, Montina [2016, 2008] ). This suggests that for every possible basis the qubit represents a different statistical preparation of a classical bit (referred to as a 'bit' hereafter). Therefore, a qubit can be represented by a continuous infinity of bits and must contain an arbitrarily large amount of information. Clearly then there is some disagreement between how much information a given qubit preparation actually contains, and it is necessary to provide an information measure that is consistent with both the Holevo bound and the argument outlined above. One resolution to this is to assert that the quantum state has no direct relation to any underlying ontology. However, in this work we will consider a solution independent of ontic or epistemic assertions.
Having established the problem we can mobilise the machinery developed earlier by realising that our coarse-grained events are the preparation and subsequent measurement of the qubit. Additionally, our dictionaries are being chosen as follows: bit value '1' maps to |↑ and '0' maps to |↓ . This means that the dictionary is actually chosen when we choose basis,
as this decides what we are measuring when we speak of |↑ and |↓ . Thus, rather than being represented by a continuous infinity of bits, a qubit is in fact compatible with a continuous infinity of dictionaries. It must be remarked upon that the same case cannot be made for a bit, as even though we could describe a given bit in any basis we please, it's commutativity and non-contextuality lead all descriptions to map unambiguously between their particular |↑ and |↓ states. The qubit, however, exhibits both non-commutativity and contextuality, leading to a lack of unique mappings between |↑ states in different bases. In other words, a measurable |↑ 1 state in a given basis could map to a linear combination of the measurable |↑ 2 and |↓ 2 states in another basis. This means that measuring |↑ 2 cannot be unambiguously mapped to the result of a counterfactual measurement in the basis defined by |↑ 1 and |↓ 1 . This would seem to suggest that we should be able to represent the qubit as an infinite set of independent bits. However, the lack of consistent basis counterfactuals will inevitably lead us to find that causal correlations in one basis will be incompatible with those in other bases and, by implication, the information content of a qubit is basis-contextual. Therefore, as a first step we can establish that the reason the qubit appears to be represented by infinite classical bits is its non-commutativity and contextuality.
If we examine the causal correlations of a qubit in a given context then we can see that the Holevo bounds emerges as follows: the causal correlations of a qubit in some basis depend on continuous parameters and can be divided into two equally weighted classes, 'prepare mostly up and measure up' and 'prepare mostly down and measure down', these are separated by a discontinuity, in the form of a class of random correlations that cannot belong to either of the aforementioned causal classes, as they do not differ in their promotion of contrasting outcomes. This means that the causal correlation space of a qubit in a given basis matches that of the statistical preparation of a bit. Therefore, since we must choose a basis to measure in, we will always find that the qubit can at most yield up one bit of information upon measurement. If we choose to measure in a different basis we will find that the causal correlation spaces of different bases are not necessarily compatible. For instance, if we define two bases β 1 and β 2 such that β 2 is rotated by an angle θ along one of the Bloch sphere directions. We then prepare a qubit so that we can transmit one bit via the causal correlations of β 1 . The |↑ 1 and |↓ 1 , which are causally associated with our preparation, each correspond to superpositions of |↑ 2 and |↓ 2 . This means that we find that it becomes highly unreliable to retrieve the β 1 bit by measuring in β 2 but also that encoding a β 2 correlation with our β 1 preparation is just as unreliable (in the sense that we lose distinguishability of states). This is an important issue, the two bits in bases 1 and 2 are not truly independent, so the infinite set of dictionaries do not in fact encode an infinite set of bits.
This can be fully illustrated by considering a state |ψ 1 = |↓ 1 . In basis 2 there is a probability ∝ sin (θ) 2 of a measurement yielding |↑ 2 . Thus, we can see that as we increase θ we are merely travelling through the causal class 'prepare mostly down and measure down'.
As we reach some θ ⋆ we transition into the random class and afterwards proceed into the 'prepare mostly up and measure up' class. Thus it is clear that the bases 1 and 2 do not posses different causal correlations, they just represent a rotation of the causal class chosen in the preparation basis. Thus, regardless of what basis we choose, we never increase the number of causal classes available to the qubit, there are always just two.
Effectively the qubit contextuality both seems to add the potential to set up simultaneous 'multi-bit' causal correlations as well as providing the linkage between bases that prevents any attempt to do so. This makes it clear that we cannot independently encode multiple bits upon a single qubit, and that the basis-contextuality of the qubit leads it to appear to be composed of infinite classical bits while still obeying the Holevo bound.
It is worth noting that we could encode multiple independent bits in the superposition structure of a qubit in β 1 , though doing so does nothing to change the number of causal correlations available to the qubit, as we have argued above. However, this preparation does change the causal correlations available to an ensemble of such qubits. In this sense we would not truly increase the information content of a single qubit, as its causal space is unchanged, merely we have created a larger causal space for a qubit ensemble.
An important aspect of the resolution of the excess baggage problem is that it is completely independent of ontological preference. Thus it obviates the difficulties experienced by ψ-ontology in this regard (Leifer [2014] ). However, it is worth noting that it does not then favour any particular ontological/epistemological view-point in quantum mechanics. The empirical/operational nature of the approach makes it agnostic towards interpretation.
This mode of explanation seems to break down when we include quantum entanglement, in which case we can perform super-dense coding with shared entanglement (Bennett and Wiesner [1992] ) and can retrieve 2N bits from N qubits. However, the entanglement has merely increased the number of exploitable correlations and this scenario remains within the remit of the interpretation of information given here. The need for shared entanglement means that we never expand the causal classes of a single qubit, as the qubit itself does not carry the information of the shared entanglement. Rather, we have enlarged causal classes of a system that consists both of the qubit and the shared knowledge of the state preparation.
What becomes evident is that the causal correlation view of information applies to all retrievable information, as observable correlations all live within the realm of derivative reality, in the vocabulary of quantum mechanics they are 'classical' objects. This illustrates that the term 'quantum information' arises as a result of the asymmetry between the parameter space of quantum states and that of causal correlations associated with those states. In short, it is the view of this author that quantum information is a collection of phenomena associated with extending information theory methods to all possible correlations rather than just causal ones. This is a necessity within quantum mechanics since it is studied as an aspect of fundamental reality and therefore the lack of distinction between derivative and fundamental reality in such problems results in all correlations possessing the acausal features of physical law. Thus 'quantum information' is not truly information at all, at least in so far as it cannot be extracted through some causal correlation within derivative reality. It is the feeling of this author that the remarkable results in quantum information science are due to the ingenious use of the rules of quantum mechanics in expanding the available space of causal correlations (although not those of a lone qubit) rather than being due to the introduction of a new kind of information per se. Therefore it seems that quantum information is a powerful functional tool but one must be deeply wary both of any metaphysical implications of its interpretation and of confusion between the meaning of information and that of 'quantum information'.
It is evident that this view can still be reconciled with those expressed by Cerf and
Adami (Cerf and Adami [1998] ): that quantum correlations, being members of fundamental reality and possessing 'quantum information' give rise to correlations with 'classical information' within derivative reality, although it can only lead to their conclusion that quantum information gives rise to classical information in the sense that some quantum correlations can map directly onto causal relations.
Black Holes and Holography
It is well known that, according to the Bekenstein-Hawking entropy (Bekenstein [1972] ), a black hole is informationally a two-dimensional object, with the entropy being related to the surface area of the event horizon. If one takes for granted that information has some deep physical meaning then one is confronted with the puzzle of a manifestly three-dimensional object that on some level is actually a two-dimensional one. However, if one takes the view of information advocated here, then the seemingly profound holographic result is reduced to the level of a triviality. This can be best illustrated in a thought experiment: an experimenter is presented with a sphere constructed out of inter-locking identical transparent cubes and a device that allows him to cause any single cube within the sphere to glow (he specifies the cube through some system of coordinates on the device). The experimenter finds that he can attribute a causal correlation between his pressing a button on the device and a chosen cube subsequently glowing. Now consider this scenario with the modification that the cubes in the surface layer of the sphere are totally opaque (assuming the sphere is large enough that the surface layer of cubes maintains full coverage). In this case the experimenter finds he can attribute a causal correlation only to cubes on the surface itself, he cannot determine if cubes in the interior respond in the same manner and thus cannot even establish an empirical non-causal correlation, even if he deduces that the fact he can even specify internal coordinates suggests that there may be glowing cubes inside the sphere. What we can determine is that the space of possible causal correlations associated with the sphere is two-dimensional, as it is specified by only the coordinates corresponding to blocks in the surface layer. We can see that this analogy holds for the black hole because the event horizon has a one-way causal impermeability (events inside cannot cause those outside, this being proof against non-local quantum causes as well from Section 3). This means that the space of all information carrying correlations between events in the exterior and the black hole is two-dimensional as well. Thus, the apparent profound holography of the black hole is just a result of our interpretation of information as having some fundamental bearing on physics, rather than as a functional but non-fundamental tool of science. Moreover, unless events within the black hole can cause those outside, it is evident that information must be lost within a black hole. Thus, it would seem that any purported solution to the 'information-loss paradox' of black-hole spacetimes (Hawking, Hawking, Preskill [1975 , 1976 ) must somehow introduce potential causal correlations that do not exist within the metrics of Shwartzschild or Kerr black holes (even when evaporation is considered). However, since it has been noted above that 'quantum information' and information are not the same, there may be the possibility of a unitarity violation being resolved without causal extensions of the spacetime. However, it must be noted that this would still mean that no actual information is extractable from within the black hole. This is due to the fact that only the quantum information needs to avoid being lost, in order to preserve unitarity, and this quantum information need not map onto any causal correlations. It also seems possible that such a nuance that would be sufficient to avoid the scenario that generates the firewall paradox raised in (A. Almheiri and Sully [2013] ). Further consideration of this speculative avenue for resolving the unitarity violation and/or firewall problem is, however, left to future work. It is noteworthy that this shares many general features of the manner in which Maudlin dismisses the information loss paradox (Maudlin [2017] ).
Returning to the thought-experiment with the opaque sphere: if the correlations are observed at some asymptotic infinity, there will be some uncertainty as to which of the bricks on the surface actually glowed, simply due to the finite size of the sphere. If we assume maximal disorder we can see that the number of possible correlations that would agree with our observation would be proportional to the number of bricks within the surface of the sphere. In order to make this relevant to the black hole we can consider the limit where the size of each cube goes to zero while the sphere stays finite, in this case the number of correlations is now proportional to the area of the sphere. If every brick were identical and the sphere symmetric, this would evidently produce an uncertainty relationship in the same vein as the Bekenstein-Hawking entropy, with glowing cubes corresponding to hawking radiation (with suitably chosen correlations). Note that there was no need here to introduce the disorder of correlations between pre and post-collapse states. While the causal account assumes there are fundamental events that give rise to our observed correlations, there is no obvious way to relate these to the micro-state of the black hole itself. Indeed, this demonstrates that the holography of the black hole has no bearing on the nature of its micro-states in any way. As the causal scenario remains independent of particular micro-details. The earlier caution about interpreting the presence of an entropy as relating to a counting of associated micro-states is quite effectively illuminated in this example.
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